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The recent Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit (CAFC) decision in NTP, Inc.
v. Research in Motion, Ltd., (hereinafter the BlackBerry decision)' ushered in a
new era of jurisdictional uncertainty concerning transnational patent disputes.
The court's standard of "control and beneficial use" for infringement purposes,
with respect to a telecommunications system with components located in both
Canada and the U.S., leaves the jurisdictional reach of U.S. patent law open-
ended. In the wake of the decision, different approaches have been discussed but
none seem entirely satisfactory from the perspectives of fairness, predictability,
and consistency with international patent law. In this short paper, we propose that
these objectives may best be achieved if states use a principle of territorial
market rights to determine legislative jurisdiction applicable to transnational
telecommunications patent disputes. This approach would guide courts in
applying national patent law according to where territorial market rights in an
invention have been exploited.
Part I will discuss the BlackBerry case and other kinds of transnational
telecommunications patent disputes (i.e. the Internet) that might arise. Part II
will critique the court's application of legislative jurisdiction in the BlackBerry
case, as well as alternative approaches that have been advanced in the literature.
* Cameron Hutchison is a Faculty of Law at University of Alberta.
** Moin Yahya is a Faculty of Law at University of Alberta.
I. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282-1326 Fed. Cir. 2005) [hereinafter NTP v. RIM].
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Part III will advance our proposal, arguing that a principle of territorial market
rights achieves fairness and predictability, as well as consistency with
international patent law.
I. TRANSNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS PATENT DISPUTES
A. NTP v. RIM
In NTP v. RIM, plaintiff Network Technology Partners (NTP) successfully sued
defendant Research in Motion (RIM) for patent infringement in regards to the latter's
famous BlackBerry system. The BlackBerry system allows out-of-office users to
receive and send e-mails through a hand-held device. The following basic units
comprise the BlackBerry network: (1) the handheld terminal (pager); (2) the e-mail
redirector software (such as the BlackBerry Enterprise Server); and (3) access to a
nationwide wireless network. 2 Essentially, the BlackBerry system routes e-mail
messages received in a personal computer account to the user's handheld device,
without a user-initiated connection The e-mail redirector software sends an email
message from a personal computer to the BlackBerry Relay via the Internet. The
Relay routes the message to a partner wireless network, which then delivers the
message to the BlackBerry handheld.4 The user is notified virtually instantly of new
e-mail messages.5 RIM's system also permits users to send email messages over the
wireless network from their handhelds.6
The BlackBerry system is, to a certain extent, similar to the U.S. patents held by
the plaintiff NTP, which disclosed a method for receiving electronic mail via
wireless systems. As opposed to the BlackBerry system, however, the NTP patents
do not provide for a method to compose and send messages from the receiver! The
CAFC nonetheless found that RIM's BlackBerry system infringed the claims of
NTP's patents.
The facts in NTP v. RIM present an interesting challenge to the reach of U.S.
patent law. Within the United States, the Canadian-based RIM sold the handheld
devices as well as supplied the software (e.g. Blackberry Enterprise) that redirected
messages from the server account to the Relay station. RIM also operated the Relay
station located in Canada, which provided the connection or "critical interface"
between the e-mail system and radio frequency (RF) transmission network. RF
networks, however, were neither owned nor operated by RIM.
2. Id. at 1289.
3. Id. at 1287.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1290.
7. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 261 F. Supp.2d 423, 426 *E.D.Va. 2002).
8. NTP v. RIM, 418 F.3d 1282, 1288.
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U.S. patent law is explicitly territorial in jurisdictional scope. Section 271 (a),
under which RIM was ultimately found liable for patent infringement, states:
"Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the
United States, or imports into the United States any patented invention
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent."9
The CAFC acknowledged the limited territorial scope of this provision, but
noted the "added degree of complexity" with respect to components located in
various places whose function and uses are separate from their physical
location.'0 RIM relied on precedent that, in its view, suggested that the "control
point" of the wireless system was the Relay located in Canada and thus, there
could be no infringement of U.S. patent law." However, the court responded by
referencing the Decca decision, a case that involved a telecommunications
system where one of the components (a transmitting station) was located in
Norway. In Decca, the court found that "ownership of the equipment by the
United States, the control of the equipment from the United States and... the
actual beneficial use of the system within the United States" justified application
of U.S. law. 2 The CAFC suggested this as a "legal framework" for analyzing this
13
case.
The CAFC distinguished between NTP's method and system patents for the
purposes of infringement. In respect to the method patent, the court agreed with
RIM that a finding of direct infringement by RIM's customers under § 271(a)
was precluded by the location of RIM's Relay in Canada. 4 RIM did not fare as
well in respect of the system patents in issue. Here, the court applied a "control
and beneficial use" standard which brought infringement under U.S. patent law.
The court began by interpreting "use" in § 271(1)(a) broadly to mean "put into
9. 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(a) (2005) (emphasis added).
10. NTPv.RIM,418F.3d 1282, 1313.
11. See Yar Chaikovsky & Adrian Percer, Globalization, Technology without Boundaries & the Scope of
U.S. Patent Law, 9 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 95, 97 (2004). RIM argued that the relay station was the 'control
point' of the wireless Blackberry system and since this was located in Canada, § 271(a) was not violated. RIM
suggested that U.S. precedent supported this argument. For example, in Hughes Aircraft v. United States, the
then Court of Claims denied infringement of a U.S. patent for an altitude controller used in a spacecraft that was
being controlled in England, but where tracking and data acquisition occurred in the United States (the "control
point" located in England). 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 787, 812 (1982). In Freedom Wireless v. Boston Communica-
tions Group, cellular calls that originated and terminated in Canada (but where pre-paid services were
administered in the U.S.) were held to have their control point in the "network of mobile switching offices in
Canada".
12. NTP v. RIM, 418 F.3d 1282, 1316. The court recognized the different legal context in which this
case appeared, but noted that it provided a legal framework for analyzing the present case.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1319.
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action or service."' 5 Applying this interpretation of use to the facts at hand, the
Court stated:
The use of the claimed system under section 271(1)(a) is the place at
which the system as a whole is put into service, i.e. where control of the
system is exercised and beneficial use of the system obtained.'
6
Thus, the court seemed to declare a requirement of control and beneficial use
of the system within the United States to bring infringement within the scope of
"use" in § 271(1)(a).'7
The CAFC appears to have adopted a modified version of the Decca test for
use under § 271(l)(a). Instead of the ownership, control and beneficial use
tripartite as per Decca, the court applied only the latter two requirements. Pro-
blems associated with this new test of legislative jurisdiction in telecommuni-
cations patent disputes will be discussed in a later section.
B. The Internet
One might expect that similar types of jurisdictional questions would arise in
connection with patented inventions that may be accessed or infringed from
points abroad through the Internet. The most likely candidate here is patented
software that may be used for such things as electronic commerce.'" Suppose, for
example, that a U.S. patent holder of software which teaches a method of online
commerce (e.g. one-click shopping) finds that a French e-commerce enterprise is
infringing its patent while conducting business with U.S. customers. One may
consider the case where a user, located outside the U.S., employs software
patented in the United States to communicate with a computer that is located in
the United States. Should U.S. patent law apply to these types of situations?
As distinct from BlackBerry-type systems, where the corporate infringer
engages known components for the operation of the system, infringement
through the Internet can often be unintentional even by sophisticated users.' 9
15. Id. at 1317.
16. Id.
17. Id. Later, however, the court indicated that "the location of the use of the communications system as
a whole occurs in the United States", thus satisfying the situs of use for the purposes of § 27 1(a).
18. This article leaves aside the technical argument that software is a process. For an interesting
discussion on that point, see Dan L. Burk, Patents in Cyberspace: Territoriality and Infringement on Global
Computer Networks, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1, 28 (1993) in which case all elements of the process would need to
occur in the United States, according to the reasoning by the CAFC in NTP v. RIM.
19. Id. at 40 ("The simple act of logging onto the network may initiate the running of infringing software
at some remote site; sending or receiving messages or accessing a remote computer may initiate more infringing
activity of which the computer operator may be unaware. Even if the operator is aware, or suspects, that his
network use has initiated infringing software activity, it may not be within his control to halt or bypass the
activity-packet routing and other network functions may proceed automatically through avenues not of his
choice.")
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Thus, there are grounds for treating Internet-based infringement differently from
other types of telecommunications patent infringement actions. The wisdom of
such a differentiated approach will be discussed in a later section.
II. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION
As stated earlier, the Patent Code is explicitly territorial in scope. As the
BlackBerry case demonstrates, this territorial limitation is not terribly helpful for
transnational telecommunications disputes involving a foreign element. U.S.
courts have struggled with territorial scope in these situations, and the resulting
tests are unsatisfactory.'
A. Ownership, Control and/or Beneficial Use
Prior to NTP v. RIM, courts applied different tests for telecommunications
patent infringements involving a foreign element. In one line of cases, a "control
point" or "master station" analysis was employed. Thus, in Hughes Aircraft,
where patented technology that was part of a satellite being controlled from the
UK, but where tracking and data acquisition occurred in the United States, the
court found that the "control point" or "master station" was in the UK and thus
extraterritorial. Thus, U.S. patent law did not apply"
With respect to modem telecommunications systems, such as the BlackBerry,
or the Internet in general, it is difficult to identify a system's control point. In the
BlackBerry case, for example, one struggles to identify which component
corresponds to the control point. Was it the relay station (i.e. the "critical
interface") in Canada? Or was it the operation of the handheld device in the
United States? And if it was the latter (as the court seems to suggest), how is this
different from "beneficial use?"
In NTP v. RIM however, both a control and beneficial use approach was
adopted, regrettably without much elaboration. The exact scope of this test
remains uncertain. For example, if I access my friend's BlackBerry in the U.S.
because she wants me to monitor her e-mail messages while she is visiting a
country where her BlackBerry won't work, I would arguably be controlling the
technology in the United States, but the beneficial use is for my friend located
outside the country. Would this be an infringement under a test requiring both
control and beneficial use? Should it be infringement? Commentators have noted
that the failure of the court to adequately explain or articulate a theory of control
20. The unstated approach of expansive jurisdictional scope as applied to transnational patents may be
the protection of U.S. innovation industries. Daniel P. Homiller, From Deepsouth to the Great White North: The
Extraterritorial Reach of United States Patent Low After Research in Motion, 17 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. (2005)
at 130.
21. Chaikovsky & Percer, supra note 11, at 97.
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and beneficial use will cause confusion.22 Furthermore, beneficial use, without
limitation, may be too expansive a reach of U.S. patent law. For example,
suppose an individual purchases software in Canada and uses that software on
her computer while in the United States. Under a beneficial use approach, that
individual would be liable for infringement under U.S. patent law even though
the software was purchased in another country.
The court in Decca adopted an ownership, control and beneficial use test,
though it is unclear whether adding a requirement of ownership adds any
coherence to the territorial infringement analysis. To illustrate the point, if I am
using my friend's BlackBerry to monitor my e-mail messages that I have asked
others to send to her account for my benefit, it seems rather arbitrary to find there
is no infringement when I have controlled and received benefit from the
infringing device, though technically I do not own it.
In our view, the above tests lack coherence because they attempt to correlate
the terminology of use with ownership, control and/or beneficial use within U.S.
territory. While ostensibly this connection appears meaningful, one sees that
these tests may, in certain fact situations, appear arbitrary. This is because the
starting framework is wrong. As we will show in the next section, the true
meaningful connection between infringement and jurisdictional scope is
territorial market rights.
B. Location of the Patentably Distinct Component
One commentator has offered an alternative basis for determining the
territorial scope of patent law, i.e., to connect jurisdiction with the location of the
infringing component of the system. In NTP v. RIM, for example, the "patentably
distinct" component of NTP's patents was the interface switch which was
embodied in the Canadian-based Relay station. 3 Thus, since the patentably
distinct component of NTP's patents was situated at the Relay station in Canada,
U.S. patent law could not apply under this approach.2" If NTP (or the original
inventors) wanted to obtain patent protection under this rule, they would have
had to file in Canada and every jurisdiction where they feared infringement might
occur. While sensible in theory, this approach is impractical. As applied to
telecommunications and computer networks, this idea may prove unwieldy.
Companies would need to engage in massive expenditures to ensure global
22. Homiller, supra note 20. In connection with the Federal Circuit's ruling, I would argue the same
point is valid in connection with the Court of Appeals' ruling.
23. John W. Osborne, A Rational Analytical Boundary for Determining Infringement by Extra-
territorially-Distributed Systems, 46 IDEA: INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 587, 603 (2006).
24. There is some doctrinal support for this approach. In Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp, 406
U.S. 518 (1972), the Supreme Court suggested that expanding territorial application was a matter for Congress
failing which, an inventor should seek patent protection "abroad through patents secured in countries where his
goods are being used": Bridget A. O'Leary Smith, NTP Inc. v. Research in Motion Ltd: Losing Control and
Finding the Locus of Infringing Use, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 347, 440-41 (2006).
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protection of their inventions by filing patents in every country." Thus, while the
"patentably distinct" test creates a predictable rule, it is unfair to patent holders
who would be burdened with expensive patent applications in numerous
countries.
III. PROPOSAL: PROTECTING TERRITORIAL MARKET RIGHTS
A. Predictability and Fairness
From a business perspective, the current system of uncertain jurisdictional
rules leads to problems of unpredictability and unfairness. In the absence of
certainty about the reach of a nation's patent law, it may be impossible for a
business to know if it is committing an act of infringement. An ex post facto
finding of infringement in these circumstances would be unfair since the party
will not have had fair warning of the potential for infringement. Thus, "'parties in
their dealings with foreigners are unable to know with certainty what laws will be
applied to their transactions in the event of litigation... a system that fails to give
parties adequate notice of the laws with which they must comply is also unfair.,
26
The possibility of concurrent or overlapping legislative jurisdiction, where two or
more countries' patent laws apply to a single infringement, also presents
problems. Concurrent legislative jurisdiction can lead to greater expense for the
parties27 who may be exposed to the patent laws of many countries in respect to a
single act of infringement. Furthermore, overlapping legislative jurisdiction may
have unforeseen results, multiple liabilities, judgments commanding inconsistent
behavior, and the imposition of one country's innovation policies onto another
state.28
Predictability and certainty for patent holders and technology users is of
prime importance for establishing a principle of legislative jurisdiction. Where
overlapping jurisdiction is unavoidable, fairness considerations should ensure
that any potential liability is limited to actual harm suffered to a patent holder. In
other words, an infringer should not, cumulatively speaking, be held liable for an
amount in excess of the total loss experienced by a patent holder regardless of the
jurisdictional question. Often, predictability will result in a measure of fairness,
though the two do not always happily coincide. In the above discussion of the
patentably distinct test, we saw an example of a predictable rule, (equating
25. Smith, supra note 24, at 452.
26. Id. at 468; ANDREW L. STRAUSS, "Beyond National Law: The Neglected Role of the International
Law of Personal Jurisdiction in Domestic Courts, in JURSIDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 423, 468 (W.
Michael Reisman ed., 1999).
27. ld. at 419.
28. Rochelle Dreyfuss, The ALl Principles on Transnational Intellectual Property Disputes: Why Invite
Conflicts, 30 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 819, 840-41 (2004-05). Having said as much, the author claims that some
patent claims contemplate activity in more than one location; without extra-territorial application of national
laws, liability may not attach to offshore infringement.
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territoriality with the location of the patentably distinct component) that placed
an unfair burden on a holder to protect her patent from locating offshore in order
to avoid infringement liability.
B. The International Legal Regime for Patent Protection
To this point, one might make two conclusions: first, that patent law is
territorial and second, determining territoriality can be difficult and controversial.
We might, therefore, benefit from uncovering the essence of territoriality that
international law-and international patent law in particular-seeks to protect.
The territoriality principle of national patent law is ultimately rooted in the
principle of state sovereignty.29 Since states at international law are sovereign
equals, "jurisdiction implies respect for the corresponding rights of other
states."3 ° As Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice stated in Barcelona Traction, international
law places limits on state discretion in exercising jurisdiction including ". . .an
obligation to exercise moderation and restraint as to the extent of the jurisdiction
assumed by the courts in cases having a foreign element, and to avoid undue
encroachment on a jurisdiction more properly appertaining to, or more
appropriately exercisable by, another State."3'
International law scholars characterize jurisdictional issues involving foreign
elements in the following way: executive, i.e. the power of a State to perform
acts in another State's territory, judicial, i.e. power of a national court to try a
case involving a foreign element, and prescriptive or legislative, i.e. state power
to apply laws involving a foreign element.32 Legislative jurisdiction need not
coincide with judicial jurisdiction. Thus a court with judicial jurisdiction may
apply foreign laws. 3  The concern of this paper is with devising a principle for
determining prescriptive (legislation) jurisdiction.
International treaties on patent law-notably the WTO Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS)--establish a territorial regime of patent
protection. The TRIPS Agreement sets minimum standards of patent protection
in WTO Member countries [Members], including:
* Exclusive patent rights with respect to making, using, selling or
importing of the technology (Art. 28).
* 20-year term of protection from patent filing date (Art. 33).
29. F.A. MANN, The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction Revisited After Twenty Years, in JURIS-
DICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 26 at 140: author also cites the principle of non-intervention,
which he seems to suggest is the same thing.
30. Id. at 20.
31. Id.at26-27.
32. See e.g. MICHAEL AKEHURST, Jurisdiction in International Law, in JURISDICTION IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, supra note 26.
33. Id. at 179.
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* Patents to be provided without discrimination as to place of inven-
tion, field of technology or whether imported or locally produced
(Art. 27).
* National treatment such that patent protection of non-nationals is to
be no less favorable than for nationals (Art. 3).
These provisions mean that Members are obliged to grant a 20-year
monopoly right to all patent holders and are prevented from affording
preferential treatment to domestic applicants. Furthermore, the regime does not
offer an "international patent" but clearly establishes a file per country system.
That is, if a patent holder wishes to protect her invention in foreign countries, she
must file a separate patent application in each of those countries.34 The converse
is also true. A business using innovative technologies in a foreign jurisdiction
must conduct a patent search (and if applicable, negotiate a license) prior to
setting up operations involving the patented technology.
The territorial aspect of TRIPS is underscored by the treaty's treatment of
market rights. Under TRIPS, a patent holder is given territorial market rights in
the patent in each jurisdiction in which it files a patent.35 TRIPS allows members
to set rules of national or international exhaustion as they see fit.3 6 Exhaustion
"defines the territorial rights of intellectual property owners after the first sale of
their protected products."37A rule of national exhaustion permits a patent holder
of one country to prevent the parallel importation from the owner or authorized
dealer of the same patented product of another country;38 in other words, national
exhaustion preserves a patent holder's right of importation of the technology. For
this reason, TRIPS does not provide for a right of export since this would violate
regimes of national exhaustion. Most developed countries have regimes of
national exhaustion thus protecting these lucrative markets from parallel
importation.
Concepts of importation and exportation pertain to trade in goods and
services and could only apply in a strained sense to telecommunications where
the act of infringement occurs in a single transaction which activates components
in multiple jurisdictions. However, the framework of the TRIPS Agreement
34. Although the Patent Cooperation Treaty facilitates patent registration in other countries.
35. That is, exclusive patent rights with respect to making, using, selling or importing of the technology.
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AGREEMENT,
art. 28, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, THE
LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 320 (1999),
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreements].
36. Id. at art. 6.
37. CARSTEN FINK, Entering the Jungle of Intellectual Property Rights Exhaustion and Parallel
Importation, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH
171 (Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005).
38. Id. Under a rule of international exhaustion, parallel imports of the product are allowed upon first
sale of the product regardless of where it occurs.
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emphasizes that what is truly important about intellectual property rights pro-
tection is the domestic market associated with those rights.
C. Proposal
Considerations of predictability and fairness are an important starting point
for developing a jurisdictional principle for transnational patent disputes. The
next step is to determine what, in essence, the international patent regime seeks
to protect through a principle of territoriality. Territoriality may correspond to the
actual location of the patentably distinct component, though such a rule would
create considerable expense for patent holders to register in every country to
prevent avoidance through offshore exploitation of the patent. Alternatively,
territoriality could apply to the control point or end use of the technology.
However, such tests have shown themselves to be uncertain or open-ended. The
best approach to assess territoriality is through the lens of market rights.
The TRIPS regime creates a file per country system of patent protection.
Within each country, moreover, TRIPS protects the market rights of the patent
holder through exclusive rights and the prevention against parallel imports (if a
country chooses a regime of national exhaustion). The regime, in other words,
seeks to protect the patent holder's market rights within each market where a
patent is registered. Infringement of these market rights can best be determined if
courts ask themselves the following question: has the patent holder been deprived
of commercial gain either directly or indirectly within the territorial boundaries
of the relevant market, e.g. sale to consumers in that market?
Basing territoriality on preserving the market rights of a patent holder within
markets associated with a patent grant would seem to be the most appropriate
principle of jurisdictional reach for the following reasons. First, it corresponds to
the TRIPS regime. Second, protection of market rights is what patent holders are
ultimately interested in preserving. Third, determining whether market rights
have been exploited is relatively easy to ascertain. Fourth, preserving market
rights also maintains the incentive to invest in research and development (and
disclose), thus reinforcing the rationales of patent protection. Fifth, it offers
predictability and fairness for patentees and technology users alike, both as a
hard and fast rule, and also in terms of the onus placed on these stakeholders of
the patent system regarding who must file a patent or conduct a patent search in
the subject country. Sixth, if all states followed this rule, the possibility of
overlapping jurisdiction and overlapping damages being imposed on infringers
would markedly decrease.
The territorial market rights principle provides guidance in resolving the
jurisdictional controversies that have been discussed in this paper. In NTP v.
RIM, the marketing of devices and software to U.S. consumers by RIM, under
this approach, is a clear deprivation of commercial rights associated with the
NTP patents granted in the U.S. In other words, RIM should have negotiated a
license prior to selling its products in that market. The territorial nexus for patent
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 21
law, therefore, is whether commercial rights associated with an invention are
being exploited within a particular market.
The situation is more complex in connection with the infringement of
software patents through the Internet. As mentioned earlier, innocent
infringement of software patents is entirely possible through computer network
exchanges on the Internet. For example, a French company that sells products
online may use software that is not patentable in France, but through e-commerce
with U.S. customers, may infringe a software patent registered in the United
States. Should the French business be held liable under U.S. patent law? There
has been much discussion as to whether, and under what circumstances, Internet
postings or transactions that potentially infringe trademark should subject an
infringer to personal jurisdiction in the receiving state. Tests developed in these
cases have distinguished between "active" and "passive" websites, 9 or some
version of an "effects-based" approach.4° Others have commented that a
foreseeability test might be the most appropriate balance between the harshness
of an effects-based rule and the uncertainty of the active/passive distinction.4
While we may speculate that unintentional software patent infringement
occurs, the paucity of actual cases does not justify deviation from the ordinary
rule of strict liability for patent infringement, at least with respect to legislative
jurisdiction. In the meantime, rules relating to personal and enforcement
jurisdiction42 should limit the harshness of this rule, i.e. strict liability under the
Act, does not mean that a court will assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant
or that its judgment would be enforced.
In sum, states should be guided by the following principle when determining
the jurisdictional reach of their patent legislation: "States should apply their
patent law to infringement cases involving a foreign element to the extent that
market rights pursuant to a patent grant have been commercially exploited, either
directly or indirectly, within that state."
D. Making It Happen
This proposal could best be implemented by an international treaty on patent
(or intellectual property) jurisdiction. Alternatively, courts may individually and
on a collective basis through judicial dialogue, help create more uniform and
predictable rules on jurisdiction by adopting a principle of territorial market
39. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa 1997).
40. Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corporation, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
41. MICHAEL GEIST, INTERNET LAW IN CANADA 67-70 (3d ed. 2002).
42. Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1216 (1998), noting that courts
usually require "something more" than mere posting of information on the web to engage personal jurisdiction
and even if that happens, defendants would need a presence (either personal or assets) in a jurisdiction for
judgment to be enforced against them. The author does not, however, address the possibility of having
judgments enforced against the defendant in another jurisdiction.
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rights to interpret national patent legislation.43 In the absence of a more uniform
approach to jurisdiction, predictability and fairness will be undermined. The
dangers of national courts applying jurisdictional rules in isolation of each other
was long ago noted by Akehurst: "[t]he rules of private international law adopted
by one country are unlikely to be satisfactory if are adopted without paying
attention to the rules adopted by other countries... [P]rivate international law will
develop in different directions along increasingly divergent lines. Such attitudes
will also obstruct the unification of private international law by treaty."" In both
the short and long term, the integrity of national and international patent laws
depends on inter-state coordination.
V. CONCLUSION
The territorial nexus between infringing activity involving a foreign element
and the application of national patent law has proven elusive in
telecommunications cases. Heretofore, territoriality has been connected to
elements in an infringement action in a manner that defies coherence. This paper
has proposed the following principle of territorial market rights to guide national
courts in determining whether to apply national patent law to transnational patent
disputes concerning telecommunications: "that states should apply their patent
law to infringement cases involving a foreign element to the extent that market
rights pursuant to a patent grant have been commercially exploited, either
directly or indirectly, within that state." It has been argued that this principle is
fair and predictable to the parties involved, accords most with international patent
law, and protects what is most valuable to the patent system and patent holders.
43. STRAUSS, supra note 26, at 428.
44. AKEHURST, supra note 32, at 111.
